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2This report identifies problems and concerns with the European Union (EU) anti-dumping  
instrument, as applied today, regardless of the fact that the investigation procedures and  
methods might be in line with the current regulation and practice. The arguments are based on 
the recent anti-dumping investigation – and imposition of anti-dumping measures – on imports  
of ceramic tiles from China, but the observations and conclusions from the analysis are valid for 
most EU anti-dumping investigations. This report is aimed as a contribution to the modernisation 
review of the EU trade defence instruments that is due to take place in 2012.
In order for the EU to use the anti-dumping instrument, four requirements must be fulfilled. 
There must be (i) dumped imports originating from a third country that cause an (ii) injury to the 
domestic production of a similar product, i.e. there must be a (iii) causal link, and it must not be 
against the (iv) EU’s public interest to impose the measures. In this report, it is claimed that the 
anti-dumping measures on ceramic tiles from China are inappropriate since these requirements 
are not fulfilled. It is not an obvious case of dumping and it is not an obvious case of injury, and 
the injury that is claimed is unlikely to be caused by the alleged “dumping”. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to identify causality. In addition, it is not likely that it would be in the EU’s interest to 
impose the anti-dumping measures.
• Considering the claim for dumping, it should be noted that the export prices from China are 
highly differentiated and that most Chinese exporters of high-end ceramic tiles are selling 
ceramic tiles at a price that is as high as or higher than in many EU Member States. The 
average import prices of ceramic tiles from China are highly differentiated among the EU 
Member States, something that implies that the alleged “dumping” is not apparent in all 
countries. The average prices on Chinese imports, as well as the average EU domestic prices, 
on ceramic tiles tend to increase. Finally, it is relevant to observe that the dumping margin is 
based on the domestic sales price of only one producer in the US.
• Considering the claim for injury, it should be noted that the EU producers dominate the 
ceramic tile market, with a 90% market share, while the Chinese market share is only  
approximately 6.5%, and the Chinese imports are decreasing in absolute terms. The volume  
of imports of ceramic tiles from China is highly differentiated among the EU Member States, 
something that implies that the alleged “injury” also varies between countries. The negative 
effects of the economic crisis were more pronounced in some countries than others, and 
small producers were affected to a greater extent than the large producers that maintained 
their profitability, i.e. the choice of companies and countries in the sample might have affected 
the calculation of the injury margin, and the injury indicators might not be fully representative  
of the actual situation.
• Considering the EU interest test, it should be noted that this criteria is not applied in a pro-
active manner; only the interested parties that manage to contact the anti-dumping investiga-
tion team within specific time limits and are accepted as cooperating parties are entitled 
certain procedural rights, i.e. there is an underlying presumption that measures to counteract 
dumping are in the interest of the EU, unless the opposite is proven. It is difficult for fragmen-
ted importers to balance the coordinated efforts of the EU producers, and the possibility of 
influencing the outcome is particularly difficult on consumer products such as ceramic tiles. 
The EU interest test analysis concluded that a “short-term price increase might have  
beneficial long term effects for consumers in ensuring competition in the market. Lack of 
competition in the long run might lead to even higher price increase and disappearance of  
low priced imports.” 
Executive Summary
3The European Commission argued in the announcement of its modernization review of its 
trade defence instruments that it makes use of the anti-dumping instrument to ensure “fair 
competition and a level playing-field for all businesses”. The EU anti-dumping regulation states 
that “the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore  
effective competition shall be given special consideration”. In the anti-dumping investigation on 
ceramic tiles, it is stated that “the aim of the anti-dumping duties is not to seal off specific trade 
channels, but to restore the level playing field and counter-act unfair competition”. Considering 
the above, this report questions the fact that the concepts of “fair” and “competition” are not 
considered or analysed in the EU anti-dumping regulation or in any anti-dumping investigation. 
If the EU competition rules would apply in anti-dumping cases, the exporters would need to 
have a (i) dominant position in the market, i.e. a market share of at least 40–50%, and they must 
(ii) abuse their dominant position in some way, such as “unfair purchasing and selling price or 
other unfair trading conditions”. In the EU anti-dumping regulation, it is only stated that the 
imports – from a country as a whole, not just a company – must constitute more than 1% of the 
EU market share. In order for price discrimination to be considered according to the competition 
rules, the price-level must undercut the average variable cost of production. In anti-dumping 
investigations, a price-level undercutting the calculated average sales price (e.g. average total 
costs and a profit margin) can also be considered as price discrimination (i.e. “dumping”). This 
indicates that the criteria for anti-dumping rules and competition rules are not comparable in 
practice, even though their foundations are based on the same idea.
In order to highlight that what is considered to be “dumping” according to the anti-dumping 
rules, could be considered to be “fair competition” according the competition rules, an example 
from the EU internal market is provided. In the case of the intra-EU production and sales of 
ceramic tiles, intra-EU “dumping”, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) definition 
and the EU rules towards third countries, is identified but no remedies are taken; this phenom-
enon is at the same time considered to be “fair competition” according to the EU competition 
rules. In this context it is also observed that prior to the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, 
anti-dumping measures were applied towards countries that are current members of the EU and 
vice versa; today, the same performance in these countries is regarded as fair competition. The 
above is due to the fact that spatial price differentiation within the EU is covered by competition 
rules – and the competition rules have higher requirements than the anti-dumping legislation with 
regard to market share and price undercutting.
As a conclusion, if competition aspects really did matter also towards third countries, the 
anti-dumping legislation would need to be revised to comply with these higher standards. If 
“dumping” is regarded as fair competition, according to the EU rules of competition, the  
imposition of anti-dumping measures must be regarded as unfair competition, unless the  
opposite is proven.
The author of this report is Jonas Kasteng, Trade Policy Adviser, National Board of Trade.
4Introduction
In autumn 2011, the European Commission 
launched a modernisation review of its trade 
defence instruments in law and practice (EC, 2011c). 
An extensive evaluation of the trade defence instru-
ments will take place in 2012. This report aims to 
contribute to this process by identifying problems 
and concerns with the EU anti-dumping instru-
ment, as applied today, regardless of the fact that 
the investigation procedures and methods might be 
in line with the current regulation and practice. The 
report focuses on the recent anti-dumping investi-
gation – and imposition of anti-dumping measures 
– on imports of ceramic tiles from China (see Box 
I), but the observations and conclusions from this 
analysis are valid for most anti-dumping investiga-
tions. 
In Part I, it is claimed that the anti-dumping 
measures on ceramic tiles from China are inappro-
priate. It is not an obvious case of dumping and it 
is not an obvious case of injury, and the injury that 
is claimed is unlikely to be caused by the alleged 
“dumping”. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify 
causality. In addition, it is not likely that it would 
be in the EU’s interest to impose the anti-dumping 
measures. These claims are contrasted to the cur-
rent EU methodology to identify and impose anti-
dumping measures.
The advocates of anti-dumping measures mostly 
argue that the measures are justified to guarantee 
fair competition. The concepts of “fair” and “com-
petition” are, however, not considered in the EU 
anti-dumping regulation or in the anti-dumping 
investigations. In this context, it is interesting to 
observe that the European Commission makes 
explicit and implicit use of the arguments of fair 
trade and fair competition in legitimising the use of 
the anti-dumping instrument in the announcement 
of the modernisation review of the EU anti-dump-
ing instrument instead of legitimising the use of the 
anti-dumping instrument on its own merits. 
“Open trade based upon a global system of rules, fair 
competition and a level playing field for all businesses are 
the very foundations of EU trade policy. Our trade defence 
system is vital to ensure that this is maintained in the face 
of unfair practices. … In today’s globalised economy, 
with a general tendency to remove obstacles to trade, these 
instruments are often the only means that companies have 
in order to restore fair trading conditions.” 
European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, in 
a press release launching the modernisation review of the 
EU Trade Defence Instruments, on 28 October 2011
In Part II, the performance of the EU ceramic 
tiles industry in the EU Member States will be ana-
lysed in line with the dumping criteria in order to 
highlight what is considered to be “dumping”, 
according to the anti-dumping rules, and what is 
considered to be “fair competition”, according the 
competition rules. The objective is to estimate if 
“dumping” is taking place within the EU, and if this 
intra-EU “dumping”, is considered as a case of nor-
mal competition instead of a cause of injury to the 
domestic industry. 
It will be argued that the phenomenon of 
“dumping”, according to the WTO definition and 
the EU rules towards third countries, is taking place 
within the EU today, but no remedies are taken. 
Prior to the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, 
anti-dumping measures were applied towards 
countries that are current members of the EU and 
vice versa; today, the same performance in these 
countries is regarded as fair competition. This is 
due to the fact that spatial price differentiation 
within the EU is covered by competition rules – 
and the competition rules have higher require-
ments than the anti-dumping legislation with 
regard to market share and price undercutting.
If competition aspects really did matter, the anti-
dumping legislation would need to be revised to 
comply with these higher standards. Hopefully, this 
is one aspect that could be seriously considered in 
the evaluation of the EU anti-dumping instrument.
Box I: Background to the anti-dumping investigation
The EU anti-dumping proceeding on imports of ceramic tiles from China was initiated following a 
complaint lodged by the European Ceramic Tile Manufacturers Association on behalf of 69 producers 
representing approximately 30% of the total EU production of ceramic tiles. The complainant argued 
that Chinese exports of ceramic tiles to the EU were sold at dumped prices and that this behaviour 
caused injury to EU producers of ceramic tiles. 
 The products covered in the anti-dumping investigation and subject to anti-dumping measures are: 
glazed and unglazed ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles; glazed and unglazed ceramic mo-
saic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing (CN codes: 69071000, 69079020, 69079080, 
69081000, 69089011, 69089020, 69089031, 69089051, 69089091, 69089093, 69089099). 
 The investigation period was defined as April 2009 to March 2010, while injury indicators were 
examined from 2007 to the end of the investigation period. Provisional anti-dumping measures in the 
range of 26.2–73.0% were imposed on 1 June 2011 and definitive anti-dumping measures in the 
range of 29.3–69.7% were imposed on 16 September 2011 (European Council, 2011). 
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6Part I
Anti-Dumping or
Unjustified Protection?
7Why this is an Inappropriate Use of the  
Anti-Dumping Instrument
In the EU anti-dumping case against imports of 
ceramic tiles from China, it is hard to argue that 
anti-dumping measures are justified (see Box II). It 
is not an obvious case of dumping and it is not an 
obvious case of injury, and the injury that is 
claimed is unlikely to be caused by the alleged 
“dumping”. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify 
causality. In addition, it is not likely that it would 
be in the EU’s interest to impose the anti-dumping 
measures. 
In the following, arguments will be presented to 
substantiate the claims that the measures imposed in 
the ceramic tiles case constitute an inappropriate use 
of the anti-dumping instrument. The argument 
against dumping and injury caused by dumping will 
be compared to the methodology used in the anti-
dumping investigations in order to impose anti-
dumping measures. This exercise will identify many 
weaknesses of the current anti-dumping proceedings 
that should be considered and amended in the mod-
ernisation review of the anti-dumping instrument.
Box II: Introduction to the anti-dumping instrument 
The anti-dumping instrument is a so-called “trade defence instrument” which is used to protect an in-
dustry in a country, or, in this case, the EU, from dumped imports originating from a third country. The 
most frequently used anti-dumping measures are ad valorem duties, i.e duties based on the value of 
the dumped product. The other trade defence instruments are anti-subsidy measures against imports 
that are subsidised by a third country and safeguard measures that are used against a sudden and 
rapid increase in imports of a certain product against imports from all countries. 
 Making use of differentiated pricing is normally a company-based decision. In order for the EU 
to use the anti-dumping instrument, four requirements must be fulfilled. There must be (i) dumped 
imports originating from a third country that cause an (ii) injury to the domestic production of a similar 
product, i.e. there must be a (iii) causal link, and it must be in the (iv) EU’s public interest to impose 
these measures. The complaining companies must constitute at least 25% of the domestic produc-
tion of the similar product in order to ensure a minimum level of representation. 
 Dumping, as defined by the WTO, occurs when exports take place at a price that is lower than the 
domestic price (or a constructed normal value) of the exporting country; the difference is defined as the 
dumping margin. Anti-dumping measures can be imposed if the dumping margin is above the de minimis 
level of 2%. When a country is not considered to be a market economy, i.e. the domestic prices are not 
considered to be representative, the “domestic price” is normally calculated based on another “ana-
logue” country where similar conditions are claimed to be prevalent. In the case of China, which is not 
recognised as a market economy country by the EU, the US is normally used as an analogue country, i.e. 
if the Chinese export price is lower than the US production cost, dumping is, by definition, taking place. 
 According to the WTO, dumping in itself is not actionable, only dumping that causes injury. There 
are various indicators of injury, but the final decision is based on an overall evaluation of the indica-
tors. The injury margin is calculated as the difference between the export price and the non-injurious 
domestic price, i.e. the theoretical price at which producers would be able to sell in the absence of 
injurious dumping. It is, accordingly, in the interest of the producers to identify a high, non-injurious 
domestic price in order to identify a high-injury margin. According to the EU rules, the anti-dumping 
measures should be equal to the lowest of the dumping margin and the injury margin.
 In anti-dumping investigations, the dumped imports do not need to have been the sole cause of 
injury. The injury margin that is subsequently calculated, however, compensates for all injury suffered 
by the EU industry, and not just the injury caused by the dumped imports.
 The public interest test – in the EU this is referred to as the Union interest test – is, in general, 
not as influential, due to the difficulties of interested parties, such as importers, user industry and 
consumers, to influence the proceedings. If all of the information were available, anti-dumping mea-
sures should not be imposed if the negative effects of the measures on importers, user industry and 
consumers are more pronounced than the positive effects for the domestic producers by imposing 
the anti-dumping measures.
 Anti-dumping measures are, in general, imposed for five years and can be prolonged for additional five-
year periods following subsequent expiry review investigations (WTO, 1994; European Council, 2009).
8Did dumping take place?
The anti-dumping duties that were imposed cover 
all kinds of ceramic tiles from China. The difference 
in the level of duties is only related to the exporters 
and not to the products considered.1 It is hard to 
claim that all Chinese producers of ceramic tiles are 
dumping their produce of ceramic tiles on the EU 
market and that they should face anti-dumping 
duties. 
Only a fraction of Chinese ceramic tile producers 
export to the EU market. For most Chinese produc-
ers, the domestic market is their main priority and 
the EU market is not particularly important.2 Even 
though the total number of Chinese exporters is 
high (there are estimations of approximately 300–
400 exporters), due to the high fragmentation of the 
industry and the fact that most Chinese exporters 
are small companies, most indicators show that the 
exported quantities are ad hoc and limited. The 
largest Chinese exporters of ceramic tiles are trad-
ing companies, and not the producers themselves. 
Trading companies are not allowed to register as 
interested parties and cannot influence the anti-
dumping investigation (Confidential exporter).
The price of exports from China is highly differ-
entiated, and most Chinese exporters of high-end 
ceramic tiles are selling for a price that is as high as 
or higher than in many EU Member States.3 The 
claim of dumping is due to the fact that dumping is 
not defined in relation to the price in the EU, but to 
the individual relationship between prices in the 
exporting country, i.e. the domestic sales price and 
the price of exports. In this particular case, due to 
the fact that China is not recognized as a market 
economy by the EU, the dumping margin is defined 
as the difference between the price on exports in 
China and the domestic sales price in the US, which 
is chosen as a comparable analogue country.
The average price of imports of ceramic tiles 
from China is highly differentiated in the EU27 
Member States, something that implies that the 
price level differs between EU Member States and/
or that the impact of Chinese imports varies 
depending on the country (see Figure 1). In 2010, 
the average price of imports ranged from 3.1 euro/
m2 in Romania to 8.8 euro/m2 in Slovakia. The aver-
age import price in the main producing country, 
Italy, was 6.9 euro/m2. This is an aspect that has not 
been fully considered in the anti-dumping investi-
gation, due to the fact that dumping is only identi-
fied on the basis of the average of the EU as a 
whole, not considering the variations in import 
price in different Member States. Accordingly, the 
alleged dumping did not occur in most EU Member 
States.4
Figure 1: Average import prices (euro/m2) of Chinese ceramic tiles to EU Member States 2009-2010
Source: Eurostat (Comext)
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9A final observation in relation to “dumping” is 
that the average total import price of ceramic tiles 
to the EU has increased from 5.2 euro/m2 in 2009 
to 5.9 euro/m2 in 2010. The corresponding import 
price from China has increased from approximately 
4.8 euro/m2 to 5.9 euro/m2 in 2010, which makes 
China the country with the fourth highest average 
price5 (see Figure 2). In addition, China is one of the 
exporting countries where the price has increased 
the most. It was actually the high share of imports 
from China that contributed to the higher total 
average import price to the EU.  
Even the anti-dumping investigation team did 
present facts that the unit sales price of domestic 
producers on the EU market increased (by 10%) 
during the period considered, from 8.0 euro/m2 in 
2007 to 8.8 euro/m2 in the investigation period (EC, 
2011b). This would normally imply that the so-
called negative effects from price dumping have not 
been that significant.
Conclusion on dumping: There are only a  
few significant Chinese exporters of ceramic tiles  
to the EU. The main exporters of ceramic tiles to 
the EU sell at prices that are as high as or higher 
than the price levels in most EU Member States.  
In addition, the Chinese import prices, as well as 
the domestic prices, on ceramic tiles tend to 
increase.
Examining the EU methodology to  
identify dumping 
Due to the fact that the US is selected as an analogue 
country for the calculation of the Chinese “domestic 
price”, all Chinese exports that are sold under the 
price level of the US are, by definition, dumped on 
the EU market. It could generally be expected that 
the cost of production in the US is higher than the 
cost of production in China. In any case, interested 
parties that came forward in the investigation 
claimed that the production level and level of com-
petition is lower in the US than in China (European 
Council, 2011). Accordingly, the dumping margin will 
also be higher than if the conditions of traditional 
low-cost economies were used.6
In this particular case, the calculation of the US 
price of ceramic tiles is based on the production of 
one company. Due to the fact that the identity of the 
company is confidential, for fear of retaliation, it is 
unclear if the production volume, value and quality 
are representative. In addition, the normal value cal-
culation was never disclosed due to the claim that 
“disclosure would be of significant competitive 
advantage to a competitor” (European Council, 2011). 
The EU industry complaint against imports of 
ceramic tiles from China is most likely to be related 
to the suspicion that Chinese subsidies might be 
involved in the production process. However, even 
Figure 2: Average import prices (euro/m2) of ceramic tiles to the EU 2009-2010 
Source: Eurostat (Comext)
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10
though subsidies would be involved, the anti-
dumping instrument is not the adequate instru-
ment to address this problem. Due to the complex-
ities in using the anti-subsidy instrument – in 
particular against non-market economies where it 
is presumed that prices are not market-based – an 
anti-dumping investigation is normally initiated if 
the domestic industry requests this kind of investi-
gation (and the price effects of subsidisation are 
treated as if they were caused by dumping).
Was “injury” caused by  
“dumping”?
In this case, the arguments for injury are not easy 
to substantiate, given the huge market share of EU 
producers and the small levels of Chinese imports. 
The EU industry of ceramic tiles has a market share 
of approximately 90%, while the Chinese market 
share in the EU is only approximately 6.5% (Euro-
pean Council, 2011). 
The EU imports of ceramic tiles from China have 
decreased, in absolute terms, by 3% since 2007, 
from 68 million m2 in 2007 to 66 million m2 in the 
investigation period. In this context, it has been 
argued that the Chinese market share of imports 
increased, in relative terms, from 4.8% to 6.5% in 
the same period (EC, 2011b). In the injury analysis it 
was stated that “[t]he market share held by the 
Union industry decreased by 1 percentage point 
over the period considered” (EC, 2011b), from 89% 
in 2007 to 88% in the investigation period. How-
ever, it cannot possibly be expected that the EU 
market share would need to remain constant or 
increase in order not to be considered to be injured. 
The injury experienced by the EU ceramic tile 
industry seems to originate from a decrease in EU 
demand rather than from increased Chinese 
imports. Imports of ceramic tiles, in general, 
decreased from 157 million m2 in 2007 to 119 mil-
lion m2 in the investigation period. The production 
of the EU industry decreased by 32% (from 1,615 
million m2 to 1,095 million m2) following a decrease 
in consumption of 29% (from 1,433 million m2 to 
1,015 million m2) during the same period.7 The EU 
production sold on the EU market decreased from 
1,275 million m2 in 2007 to 895 million m2 in the 
investigation period. This decrease in demand is, 
among other things, due to the downturn of the 
construction sector in the wake of the recent eco-
nomic crisis. The anti-dumping investigation team 
admits that “it cannot be disregarded that the nega-
tive evolution of consumption has had a negative 
effect on the Union industry” (EC, 2011b). 
The volume of imports of ceramic tiles from 
China differs between the EU Member States, 
Figure 3: Total import volumes (m2) of Chinese ceramic tiles to EU Member States 2009-2010 
Source: Eurostat (Comext)
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which implies that the level of injury also varies 
(see Figure 3). The main producing countries are the 
largest importers of ceramic tiles from China.8 The 
main injury due to the economic crisis was experi-
enced in Spain and Italy, due to the decrease in 
consumption. The Spanish imports of ceramic tiles 
from China decreased by as much as 37% between 
2009 and 2010, something that might weaken the 
argument for injurious dumping. 
Conclusion on injury: The EU producers domi-
nate (up to 90%) the EU market of ceramic tiles.  
The Chinese market share is only approximately 
6.5% and the imports are decreasing in absolute 
terms. The injury experienced by EU producers is 
most likely due to the economic crisis and its sub-
sequent effects on demand, production and 
employment in the sector. The negative effects of 
the crisis were most pronounced in Spain and Italy, 
and small producers were affected to a greater 
extent than the large producers, as they maintained 
their profitability.
Examining the EU methodology to identify injury 
It is stipulated that the anti-dumping investigation 
should consider the EU as a whole, and not the 
individual Member States, when assessing the need 
for imposing EU-wide anti-dumping measures. 
However, if companies from certain countries and/
or of certain sizes are selected in the sample, it 
might be easier for the anti-dumping investigation 
to present a claim, depending on which countries 
and which companies are selected, as will become 
apparent below. 
In the anti-dumping investigation, it was argued 
that the fact that EU Member States were affected 
differently by the economic crisis – which, in turn, 
affected the demand and employment opportuni-
ties – was “not supported by any substantiated evi-
dence” (European Council, 2011) and that the 
imports from China – as well as its negative effects 
– were evenly spread out across the EU. The anti-
dumping investigation team also claimed that the 
injury analysis was made in relation to the EU 
industry as a whole and not just a part of it.9
In this context, it is important to note that while 
the Chinese exporters were identified on basis of 
export volume only, the EU producers were divided 
into different segments – small, medium-sized and 
large companies – as well as geographic distribu-
tion, and each segment was analysed in order to 
consider the particular situation of each group 
(European Council, 2011).10 The choice of compa-
nies and countries in the sample might, accord-
ingly, have affected the calculation of the injury 
margin in the anti-dumping investigation.
It has been confirmed in the anti-dumping 
investigation that only the segment of small pro-
ducers of ceramic tiles were making a loss during 
the investigation period, while medium-sized and 
large producers maintained their profitability. The 
anti-dumping investigation team states that “[i]n 
order to ensure that the results of large companies 
did not dominate the injury analysis but that the 
situation of the small companies, collectively 
accounting for the biggest share of the Union pro-
duction, was properly reflected, it was considered 
that all segments, i.e. small, medium-sized and 
large companies, should be represented in the sam-
ple” (European Council, 2011). However, by only 
including one large company in the sample, the cal-
culated average profit cannot be regarded as being 
representative for the average profit of the EU 
industry. Factories producing more than 10 million 
m2 annually produce goods at significantly lower 
costs than smaller factories, and smaller companies 
have a completely different cost/sales structure and 
organisation than larger production companies 
(European Council, 2011). If only the largest pro-
ducers were considered in the analysis, it might 
have been hard to claim any form of injury.11
In the anti-dumping investigation, it was argued 
that if only the largest EU producers were sampled, 
the data and analysis would only be representative 
of 5% of the EU industry and 23% of its production 
volume, and the result would most likely have been 
based on only one EU member country (EC, 2011d). 
In this context, the anti-dumping investigation 
team emphasised the importance of taking into 
consideration “the weight of the respective produc-
tion countries” (EC, 2011d) in order to represent the 
whole EU industry.
As a comparison, the production structure of 
exporters was not considered and the analysis was 
based only on the largest exporters (EC, 2011b). It 
could be questioned why the need to ensure a 
proper representation by sector was not necessary 
for the Chinese producers, which is also highly 
fragmented. Using a standard or a consequent 
approach would leave no room for manoeuvre, 
with the advantage that there would be less reason 
to suspect a manipulation of the sample. The stand-
ard method was, for some reason, not used in the 
ceramic tiles case.
It has also been criticised that EU Member 
States with low production costs and/or sales prices 
were not considered in the sample of EU produc-
ers. This means that the average sample sales prices, 
and the injury indicators, might not be representa-
tive of the actual situation. Poland was initially 
included in the sample, but the Polish company 
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involved decided to pull out of the sample and dis-
continue its cooperation and no other Polish com-
pany agreed to be a replacement (EC, 2011b). In this 
context, the anti-dumping investigation team 
argues that the Polish produce “would have had a 
very limited weight on the overall undercutting  
calculation” and it “would have not changed the 
overall picture in view of the relative low sales  
volumes … in any meaningful way” (EC, 2011b). 
However, the Polish share of the EU market of 3% 
should be considered in relation to the Chinese 
market share of 6.5%, which is the reason for the 
entire anti-dumping investigation12 (European 
Council, 2011). 
The information from the sample was later used 
for the calculation of the non-injurious domestic 
price13 and the injury margin suffered by the 
domestic industry, as well as in the establishment 
of injury indicators. In order to indicate the com-
plexity of this particular case, it should be men-
tioned that, for fear of retaliation, information on 
the EU industry that presented the complaint on 
dumping is also confidential. As a result, the inter-
ested parties are unable to verify and comment on 
how accurate the specific arguments of the com-
plaint were.  
With regard to importers, it has been claimed 
that the anti-dumping investigation did not take 
into account the higher price of certain imports in 
spite of the fact that the information presented by 
the companies selected in the sample, for example 
small importers, should be representative for the 
companies in a similar situation that are not 
included in the sample14 (Confidential importer). 
Was the Union interest test  
assessed?
In the EU, it is according to the anti-dumping regu-
lation compulsory to take the Union interest test 
into account before the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures. The EU interest test should be based on 
an appreciation of all the various interests, includ-
ing the interests of the domestic industry, import-
ers, user industry and consumer organisations, 
after all parties have been given the opportunity to 
make their views known. Anti-dumping measures 
may not be imposed if they contravene the interests 
of the EU.15
Dismissing negative effects of imposing  
anti-dumping duties
In the ceramic tiles case, the anti-dumping investi-
gation team argued that “the rather low level of 
cooperation of unrelated importers could suggest 
that the imposition of measures would not have  
a significant impact on their activity” (EC, 2011b).  
In addition, it was claimed that “only one importer 
submitted evidence on the difficulties in switching 
to a different source of supply” and this is “no  
conclusive evidence” (EC, 2011d). On the contrary, 
it was argued that “it is possible for importers and 
users to switch to products sourced in third parties 
or in the Union” and that “[t]his change can occur 
quite easily” (EC, 2011b). 
The anti-dumping investigation team argued 
that claims that “duties would lead to an increase  
in consumer prices and a switch to other sources  
of supply would trigger a high cost, both for dis-
tributors and customers … have not been sub-
stantiated” (European Council, 2011). In any case, 
“[t]he impact of anti-dumping duties on consumers 
is likely to be limited, since the mark-up applied by 
resellers is normally very high. Even in case of  
price increases, these would rather have a limited 
impact on consumers given that the cost increase 
would range between EUR 1.5 and EUR 3 per m2” 
(EC, 2011b). 
The anti-dumping investigation team claimed 
that there is a “possibility to of pass on at least a 
part of potential cost increases to their customers” 
(EC, 2011b). It also argued that “the value can be 
diluted in the various steps (importers, wholesalers 
and retailers) before reaching the final customer” 
(EC, 2011b). In addition, “[i]ndividual consumers 
buy limited quantities of tiles and not too fre-
quently” (EC, 2011b).16
The anti-dumping investigation team admitted 
that “[i]t cannot be excluded that some importers 
are negatively affected by measures and that they 
could have some difficulties in supplying particular 
categories of product” (EC, 2011d). In addition, it 
admitted that “small specialist shops would be  
significantly affected” but “the Commission could 
not obtain any conclusive data that would confirm 
the magnitude and the extent of impact” (EC, 
2011b).  With regard to the user industry, it was 
claimed that “in the construction sector … ceramic 
tiles have a marginal bearing on final costs” (EC, 
2011b).
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Advocating positive effects of imposing 
anti-dumping duties
The anti-dumping investigation team claimed that a 
“short-term price increase might have beneficial long 
term effects for consumers in ensuring competition 
in the market. Lack of competition in the long run 
might lead to even higher price increase and disap-
pearance of low priced imports” (EC, 2011b). The 
anti-dumping investigation team also argued that  
“it should be remembered that ceramic tiles are pro-
duced in the Union” and that “there is a large offer  
of products in the market not subject to measures … 
by Union producers” (European Council, 2011).17
In the anti-dumping investigation on ceramic 
tiles, it was finally stated that “it cannot be clearly 
concluded that the imposition of measures would go 
against the Union interest” (European Council, 2011). 
Examining the EU methodology to disregard  
the Union interest test 
The EU interest test is not applied in a proactive man-
ner, only the interested parties that manage to contact 
the anti-dumping investigation team within specific 
time limits and are accepted as cooperating interested 
parties will be considered in the EU interest test ana-
lysis, i.e. they are entitled to certain procedural rights. 
However, there is an underlying presumption that 
measures to counteract dumping are in the interest of 
the EU, unless the opposite is proved. The possibility 
of influencing the outcome is particularly difficult on 
consumer products such as ceramic tiles.
In practice, it is difficult for the importers, user 
industry and consumer organisations to make use of 
the opportunity to be heard in an anti-dumping 
investigation. There are various reasons behind this. 
The interested parties – other than the EU producers 
that complained about alleged dumping – are nor-
mally unaware of the anti-dumping investigation. In 
most cases, interested parties have never heard about 
the anti-dumping instrument. Even if they know 
about the investigation and want to make themselves 
known and influence the process, it is a costly and 
time-consuming process with very short deadlines to 
register and present detailed information in order to 
be considered. The anti-dumping process is particu-
larly complex for small and medium-sized compa-
nies, but also large diversified companies have  
difficulties in specifying the effects related to the 
anti-dumping duties on one particular product. 
In addition, it is difficult for cooperating inter-
ested parties to influence the outcome of the inves-
tigation due to the fact that there is no objective 
procedure that means the investigators are obliged 
to include the arguments of the interested parties. 
Furthermore, today’s Union interest test tends to  
be qualitative in nature, as it does not affect the 
product scope, the levels of the dumping or injury 
margins, or the anti-dumping measures that are 
finally imposed. A number of replies are rejected, as 
they are not considered to contain sufficient factual 
evidence. The fact that importers, user industry, 
wholesalers, retailers and consumers make them-
selves known does not affect the assessment of the 
EU interest test significantly. 
Conclusion on Union interest test: Interested 
parties cooperated with the European Commission 
in the anti-dumping investigation, but it is difficult 
for fragmented importers to balance the coordi-
nated efforts of the EU producers, and there is no 
proactive effort of quantification and/or cost-bene-
fit analysis in the anti-dumping investigation. Only 
the arguments put forward by the interested parties 
in each individual anti-dumping case are taken into 
account in the investigation.
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Part II
Dumping or Competition?
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Why this is a Case of Normal Competition 
“In the absence of international competition rules 
and of other rules associated with well functioning 
markets, trade defence instruments are the only  
possible means of protecting our industry against 
unfairly traded goods.” 
European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht,  
in his speech “Anti-dumping cases – state of play and  
perspectives” to the European Parliament on 24 November 
2010.
Anti-dumping measures are, according to their 
advocates, aimed at restoring and ensuring fair 
trade and fair competition. In the anti-dumping 
investigation on ceramic tiles, it was stated that  
“the aim of the anti-dumping duties is not to seal 
off specific trade channels but to restore the level 
playing field and counter-act unfair competition” 
(EC, 2011a). The anti-dumping investigation team 
also argued that a “short-term price increase might 
have beneficial long term effects for consumers in 
ensuring competition on the market. Lack of com-
petition in the long run might lead to even higher 
price increase and disappearance of low priced 
imports” (EC, 2011b). In this context, it is relevant to 
observe that the European Commission, as recently 
as in its announcement of its modernisation review 
of the EU anti-dumping instrument, makes explicit 
and implicit use of the arguments of fair trade and 
fair competition in legitimising the use of the anti-
dumping instrument.
However, in most cases it is inappropriate to 
discuss issues of competition in relation to anti-
dumping measures, since the instruments, as they 
are applied today, have nothing in common. It is 
important to observe that the concepts of “fair” and 
“competition” are not considered or analysed in the 
EU anti-dumping regulation or in any anti-dump-
ing investigation. Only in relation to the Union 
interest test in the EU anti-dumping regulation,  
it is stated that “the need to eliminate the trade dis-
torting effects of injurious dumping and to restore 
effective competition shall be given special consid-
eration” (European Council, 2009). If fair trade, fair 
competition and/or “effective competition” are 
among the main arguments for legitimizing the use 
off anti-dumping measures, why are competition 
rules not considered in the anti-dumping regula-
tion and why are competition aspects not applied 
in the anti-dumping investigations? 
In the following it is argued that the phenome-
non of “dumping”, according to the WTO definition 
and the EU rules towards third countries, is taking 
place within the EU today without remedies. This  
is due to the fact that spatial price differentiation 
within the EU is covered by competition rules – 
and the competition rules have higher require-
ments than the anti-dumping legislation with 
regard to market share and price undercutting.
The background: Anti-dumping 
rules versus competition rules 
within the EU 
Prior to the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007,  
the EU15 and EU25 made use of the anti-dumping 
instrument against current EU27 members, such as 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.18 In addi-
tion, these countries made use of the anti-dumping 
instrument against the EU15 and EU25, respectively. 
However, after the EU enlargements, the anti-
dumping rules have, in practice, been “replaced” by 
competition rules.19
The production process and trade among the EU 
Member States have not changed dramatically after 
the accessions, but what was perceived as a prob-
lem and “injury” before is now integrated into the 
same internal market without any remedial action. 
The performance that was previously regarded as 
dumping in now regarded as fair competition. 
The EU is actually the only customs union in the 
world that has managed to abolish the application 
of all three trade defence instruments on intra-
regional trade. The creation of a single market 
seems to be a critical element in phasing out the 
use of the anti-dumping instrument. The EU has 
also phased out the use of the anti-dumping instru-
ment in the European Economic Area, with the 
exception of agriculture and fish products.20
The result: “Dumping” within the 
EU is not remedied 
It is apparent that the cost of production and/or 
sales prices varies in different EU Member States, 
and not all EU Member States export their prod-
ucts at the same price. There is, accordingly, a high 
degree of price differentiation on the same product 
on the EU internal market. 
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Table 1: Dumping of ceramic tiles within the EU
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping margin 
Unglazed ceramic mosaic tiles, etc. (surface area <49 cm2)
[Prodcom code: 23311010/CN code: 69071000]
Italy 19.7 2.4 17.3
Spain 6.5 4.8 1.7
Glazed ceramic mosaic tiles, etc. (surface area <49 cm2)
[Prodcom code: 23311020/CN code: 69081010, 69081090]
Italy 13.9 6.5 7.4
Spain 20.4 5.8 14.6
Unglazed stoneware flags and pavings, etc. (excluding double tiles of the Spaltplatten type)
[Prodcom code: 23311053/CN code: 69079091]
Denmark 46.6 38.7 7.9
France 8.3 6.6 1.7
Poland 5.8 3.8 2.0
Earthenware or fine pottery and other unglazed ceramic flags and pavings, etc
[Prodcom code: 23311057/CN code: 69079093, 69079099, 69079010]
France 13.7 6.1 7.6
Germany 28.2 8.7 19.5
Glazed stoneware flags and pavings, etc., with a face of >90 cm2
[Prodcom code: 23311073/CN code: 69089021, 69089091]
Denmark 52.2 10.5 41.7
Italy 9.2 6.8 2.4
Germany 12.1 8.0 4.1
Glazed earthenware or fine pottery ceramic flags and pavings, etc., with a face of >90 cm2
[Prodcom code: 23311075/CN code: 69089093]
Bulgaria 4.4 3.6 0.8
France 7.3 6.5 0.8
Poland 6.1 5.4 0.7
Glazed ceramic flags and pavings, etc. with a face of not >90 cm2
[Prodcom code: 23311079/CN code: 69089021, 69089029, 69089051, 69089099]
Hungary 8.2 5.7 2.5
Italy 13.0 7.4 5.6
Portugal 7.3 6.7 0.6
Romania 21.9 7.9 14.0
If the issue of “dumping” really would constitute 
a problem for the EU industry, the situation would 
be quite problematic on the EU internal market, 
due to the fact that many producing countries 
within the EU export to other EU Member States at 
a price lower than their domestic sales price. This 
could be a cause of alleged “injury” in line with the 
imports from China. Actually, in the anti-dumping 
investigation on ceramic tiles, “[o]ne importer 
claimed that the main cause of injury was low-
priced sales by Polish tiles producers” (EC, 2011b). 
An analysis of the domestic sales prices in EU 
Member States compared with the export prices to 
the EU27 indicates that the phenomenon of “dump-
ing” on the EU internal market is likely to be occur-
ring with regard to ceramic tiles (see Appendix I for 
a detailed description of the methodology and data 
used). It is normally argued that the risk of “dump-
ing” within the EU is minimal, since goods and ser-
vices can circulate freely within the internal market 
and price variations should be levelled out, but this 
seems not always to be the case.
Ceramic tile product categories – produced in cer-
tain EU Member States, where data is available – are, 
in a number of cases, exported to other EU Member 
States at below the domestic sales prices (see Table 1 
and Appendix II). This is a phenomenon equal to 
dumping, according to the definition of the concept, 
and the effects with regard to “injury” to the EU pro-
ducers are all the same. In addition, the domestic 
sales prices, as well as the export prices, on ceramic 
tiles produced in different EU Member States, varies 
quite significantly between the countries. 
The statistical conclusions presented above 
imply that “dumped” ceramic tiles from various EU 
Member States could be a cause of “injury” to a 
similar or greater extent than the imports from 
China. If differentiated prices were a problem, then 
the price differentiation on the EU internal market 
would also need to be remedied. However, no 
Source: Author´s calculation based on Eurostat (Prodcom and Comext) where data is available (see Appendix I and Appendix II)
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competition measures are taken against EU Mem-
ber States that export products at a price below 
their domestic price or at prices below their com-
petitors in other EU Member States if the company 
concerned does not have a dominant position. This 
is due to the fact that the rules of competition 
demand higher requirements than the anti-dump-
ing rules. This market-based behaviour is, on the 
contrary, considered to be a case of normal compe-
tition to the benefit of the consumers. 
The conclusion: “Dumping” is not 
unfair competition
Price undercutting, according to competition rules, 
is only condemned if the alleged offender has (i) a 
dominant position21 and (ii) if this position is 
abused, i.e. if the offender sets a price below the 
average variable cost of production in an effort to 
squeeze out the competitors from the market and/
or to pre-empt new firms from entering the market 
(Swedish National Board of Trade, 2009). Competi-
tion policy is often concerned with consumer pro-
tection, but the anti-dumping rules, as they are 
applied today, are only concerned with the protec-
tion of the complaining industry (Hoekman, 2003). 
In other words, dumping, as defined by the WTO, is 
setting a lower price in the export market than in 
the home market, but it is not a violation, per se, 
according to the competition law.
In order for the EU competition rules to apply in 
anti-dumping cases, the exporters would need to 
have a dominant position in the market, i.e. a market 
share of at least 40–50% (EC, 2009; Swedish Compe-
tition Authority, 2010), and they must abuse their 
dominant position in some way, such as “unfair pur-
chase or selling prices or other unfair trading condi-
tions” (Article 102, Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union). However, it would not be neces-
sary to identify injury – the abuse of the dominant 
position is in itself prohibited. In the anti-dumping 
regulation, it is only stated that the imports (from a 
country as a whole, not just a company) must con-
stitute more than 1% of the EU market share. In the 
expiry review investigations, no criteria on the mar-
ket share of imports exist, and it could, accordingly, 
be under 1% (European Council, 2009).
Price discrimination is only one of several illegal 
practices in competition law, i.e. if the company 
concerned has a dominant position. In order for 
price discrimination to be considered according to 
competition rules, the sales price must undercut the 
average variable cost of production.22 As a compari-
son, in anti-dumping investigations a price-level of 
exports undercutting the domestic sales price, i.e. 
the average total cost of production (e.g. average 
fixed costs and average variable costs) in addition to 
a reasonable profit margin23, can be considered as 
dumping, something that is not in line with the 
competition law concept. In today’s anti-dumping 
investigations, spatial price differentiation of any 
kind is actionable as an “unfair” abuse of market 
power, regardless of the market share of the com-
pany. The fundamental insights of trade theory, 
such as specialisation and comparative advantage, 
are, accordingly, disputed and/or ignored.
Predatory dumping is one extreme form of price 
discrimination, in which a dominating company 
lowers its prices in order to put competitors out of 
business (Wooton & Zanardi, 2002). Today’s anti-
dumping measures have little to do with predatory 
dumping, which is the only economic justification 
for anti-dumping measures to be applied, due to 
the fact that the criteria of dominant position is not 
considered and the export price must not be below 
the average variable cost of production in order to 
be actionable.
The main argument behind anti-dumping invest-
igations is that exporters are dumping their products 
on the EU market in order to put the EU industry 
out of business. Eventually, the exporters will be 
able to raise prices and harm users and consumers 
when there is no remaining competition.24 However, 
in anti-dumping cases, the risk that any exporter 
would be able to obtain such a dominant position in 
the EU market is limited. For this scenario to be 
realistic, the exporters from the country being sub-
ject to an anti-dumping investigation should have a 
dominant position in the market and cooperate, not 
compete, with each other, and there should be no 
imports from firms in other countries.25 However, 
the number of competing exporters in most anti-
dumping investigations is normally large and there 
are frequently other third country imports involved. 
If the competition aspect was really important in 
anti-dumping proceedings also towards third 
countries – as it is claimed to be in order to legiti-
mise the use of the anti-dumping instrument – the 
anti-dumping legislation would need to be revised 
in order to comply with these higher standards. An 
intermediate option would be to redesign the appli-
cation of anti-dumping measures to target only 
anti-competitive practices by introducing a two-tier 
system – adjusted to accommodate competition 
law concepts – where an anti-dumping case would 
first be judged using the competition law criteria 
and then proceed with the anti-dumping investiga-
tion. If unfair competition is a problem, this pro-
ceeding could be part of a solution.
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Implications on Competition of Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Ceramic Tiles
The anti-dumping investigation on ceramic tiles is 
an example of how anti-dumping measures are 
used against consumer goods. Anti-dumping meas-
ures on consumer goods directly affect the con-
sumers by increasing the prices and limiting their 
choices. However, there are more problems than 
higher prices; for example the fact that some  
competitive, flexible and innovative exporters of 
ceramic tiles from third countries can no longer 
compete on the EU market. This implies that anti-
dumping measures limit the competition and the 
incentive for innovation with regard to products 
and production processes in the EU market.26
The recently imposed anti-dumping duties on 
ceramic tiles are a particular problem for importers 
that might have found a new business opportunity 
in China in order to be able to offer ceramic tiles in 
a full range of sizes to their customers. Importers 
argue that the EU ceramic tile producers are inflex-
ible with regard to design and quantities, i.e. they 
tend to not accommodate specific requests outside 
their standard product range. According to infor-
mation provided by importers, it is not possible for 
buyers to order ceramic tiles of certain characteris-
tics (e.g. form, size, design, logotype and packaging) 
from EU producers, nor certain third country pro-
ducers, if they are not ordered in sufficiently large 
quantities (Confidential importer). The impression 
is that the EU industry has been in the market for 
many decades without any competition, and it 
decides what it wants to produce and at what price. 
The imports, and corresponding competition, 
from China have contributed to a shift in produc-
tion in the EU, where EU producers have had to 
adapt to the customers’ demands. It should not be 
correct to argue, like in the anti-dumping investiga-
tion, that China “forced” the EU industry to pro-
duce smaller batches and larger varieties in terms of 
colour and size27 (European Council, 2011). Instead 
of being considered to be a problem, having to 
adapt to demand should be considered to be an 
example of normal competition. This is what is 
demanded from customers – and this is why there 
are imports of ceramic tiles from China. On the 
contrary to what is being claimed, anti-dumping 
duties are likely to affect trade and competition 
negatively, due to the fact that fair competition is 
likely to be limited. 
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Appendix I: Methodology Used for the  
Calculation of the Intra-EU Dumping Margins
The calculations of the intra-EU dumping margins 
use data provided by Eurostat on EU production 
(Prodcom) and EU internal and external trade 
(Comext) for the year 2010, as it closely corre-
sponds to the investigation period. The calculations 
are based on the data publicly available in these 
databases for the selected year, with all its inherent 
limitations. The intra-EU dumping margins that are 
presented in this report are only claimed to be an 
approximation, and/or an indication, of the reality.
The “domestic price” calculation is based on the 
Prodcom codes (NACE Rev. 2) on the production 
value for ceramic tiles28, i.e. the value of production 
(PRODVAL) of the individual EU Member State, 
divided by the production quantity in square 
meters (PRODQNT) of the individual EU Member 
State, where data is available. The “export price”  
is based on the Comext data on the Combined 
Nomenclature (CN) codes on an 8-digit level that 
correspond to the above-mentioned Prodcom 
codes29, i.e. the value in euros (VALUE_IN_EUROS) 
of imports of the individual EU Member State, 
divided by the corresponding supplementary 
quantity (SUPPLEMENTARY_QUANTITY) in 
square meters of the individual EU Member State. 
Import statistics are used to obtain the Cost, Insur-
ance and Freight (CIF) price of the product30, as this 
is commonly used in anti-dumping calculations.
Due to the fact that the production value only is 
available on an annual basis, and not available for 
all EU Member States, Prodcom codes – where data 
is available – serve as the basis for the calculation 
of the dumping margin, and the CN codes are 
accordingly identified to match the Prodcom codes. 
In some cases, the Prodcom code and the CN code 
correspond perfectly; in other cases, several CN 
codes correspond to one Prodcom code. In these 
cases, the average price for each product is calcu-
lated, weighted (based on value), and aggregated in 
order to obtain a representative average price (euro/
m2) for each Prodcom code. 
In the calculations of the “domestic price”, only 
the EU Member States where production data is 
publicly available in the Prodcom database are pre-
sented in the tables. This explains why only a cer-
tain number of EU Member States are found in the 
tables, and why the number of countries varies with 
regard to the Prodcom codes that are analyzed. As 
the calculation of the production value is based on 
yearly reporting, it has not been possible to verify 
the statistics, and possible outliers, in further 
detail.31 In addition, it has to be recognized that the 
production value in the Prodcom database refers to 
the sales value in the country concerned and it 
does not distinguish between domestic sales and 
foreign sales, something that might be influencing 
the average numbers.
In the calculations of the “export price” for the 
EU Member States where Prodcom data is availa-
ble, the calculations have been based on EU27 
import statistics from the EU Member State con-
cerned in order to obtain the CIF value, instead of 
using the export statistics of the country concerned 
to EU27. Depending on the data used (e.g. import 
statistics or export statistics), the numbers might 
vary. In this report it has been considered that the 
import statistics are more comparable across the 
countries, due to the fact that the same sources are 
used for the data for all EU Member States. It has to 
be recognized that countries that only export small 
ad hoc quantities are more likely to present less 
representative prices per square meters than coun-
tries with high export volumes, due to the fact that 
each transaction in these cases constitutes a higher 
share of the total value. In addition, it is important 
to be aware of the fact that not only the countries of 
origin are considered in the Comext statistics; it is 
accordingly inevitable that price-levels of re-
exports, i.e. products that are not produced in the 
EU Member State concerned, might influence the 
average prices (euro/m2) that are presented.
The calculations of the intra-EU dumping mar-
gins in the report are not claiming to be detailed 
and/or comprehensive. On the contrary, they need 
to be further verified at a more detailed and product- 
specific level. In any case, the calculations of the 
intra-EU dumping margins provide an indication of 
a market-based behaviour that might be prevalent 
on the EU internal market. This behaviour might be 
referred to as either “dumping” or fair competition. 
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Appendix II: Examples of Intra-EU “Dumping” 
of Ceramic Tiles 
Unglazed ceramic mosaic tiles, cubes and similar articles, with a surface area < 49 cm²    
Prodcom code: 23311010 
CN code: 69071000
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Italy 19.7 2.4 X
Portugal 10.4 14.5 -
Spain 6,5 4,8 X
Glazed ceramic mosaic tiles, cubes and similar articles, with a surface area < 49 cm² 
Prodcom code: 23311020 
CN code: 69081010, 69081090
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Italy 13.9 6.5 X
Spain 20.4 5.8 X
United Kingdom 128.4 15.9 X
Unglazed stoneware flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles (excluding double tiles of the Spaltplatten type)  
Prodcom code: 23311053 
CN code: 69079091
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Denmark 46.6 38.7 X
France 8.3 6.6 X
Germany 11.9 12.7 -
Ireland 12.9 15.4 -
Italy 10.9 11.3 -
Lithuania 6.4 11.2 -
Poland 5.8 3.8 X
Portugal 8.9 8.9 -
Spain 10.8 12.0 -
Earthenware or fine pottery and other unglazed ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles  
(excluding of siliceous fossil meals or similar siliceous earths, refractory ceramic goods, articles  
of stoneware, double tiles of the ‘’Spaltplatten’’ type, tiles made into stands, ornamental articles  
and tiles specifically manufactured for stoves) 
Prodcom code: 23311057 
CN code: 69079010, 69079093, 69079099
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
France 13.7 6.1 X
Germany 28.2 8.7 X
Greece 6.7 7.8 -
Italy 6.3 11.8 -
Lithuania 62.7 13.2 -
Spain 3.3 9.8 -
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Glazed ceramic double tiles of the Spaltplatten type  
Prodcom code: 23311071 
CN code: 69089011, 69089031
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Germany 8.2 13.1 -
Italy 9.0 25.9 -
Spain 8.6 17.4 -
Glazed stoneware flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles, with a face of > 90 cm²  
Prodcom code: 23311073 
CN code: 69089021, 69089091
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Denmark 52.2 10.5 X
Finland 11.9 15.1 -
France 6.2 7.1 -
Germany 12.1 8.0 X
Italy 9.2 6.8 X
Poland 4.4 4.8 -
Portugal 6.5 6.7 -
Spain 6.2 7.6 -
Glazed earthenware or fine pottery ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles, with a face of > 90 cm²    
Prodcom code: 23311075 
CN code: 69089093
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Bulgaria 4.4 3.6 X
Estonia 80.0 12.2 X
Finland 9.3 9.5 -
France 7.3 6.5 X
Germany 6.9 10.6 -
Italy 6.3 7.3 -
Poland 6.1 5.4 X
Portugal 4.1 5.9 -
Spain 5.0 8.3 -
Glazed ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles excluding double tiles of the spaltplatten type, 
stoneware, earthenware or fine pottery flags, paving or tiles with a face of not > 90 cm²   
Prodcom code: 23311079 
CN code: 69089021, 69089029, 69089051, 69089099
EU Member State Domestic price 
(euro/m2)
Export price to EU27 
(euro/m2)
Dumping 
Germany 6.9 13.3 -
Greece 5.9 8.3 -
Hungary 8.2 5.7 X
Italy 13.0 7.4 X
Lithuania 5.0 6.0 -
Portugal 7.3 6.7 X
Romania 21.9 7.9 X
Spain 6.6 7.9 -
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Endnotes
1 The anti-dumping investigation team argues that ceramic 
tiles of all kinds “were found to have the same basic physical 
and technical characteristics as well as the same base uses” 
(EC, 2011b). However, it could be claimed that this 
reasoning is too broad to target certain “dumped” products. 
2 In fact, one of the reasons why measures could be 
imposed without large opposition from China was due  
to the lack of activity and/or support on behalf of relevant 
Chinese chambers of commerce and/or industrial 
associations, given the fact that most Chinese producers 
are not as dependent on exports to the EU (Confidential 
importer).
3 The five main exporters of ceramic tiles to the EU are 
selling their produce at average prices that are in line with 
or above the average EU price level. It is estimated that 
only about half of the smaller ad hoc exporters of ceramic 
tiles to the EU sell ceramic tiles of poor quality and lower 
price levels, but low quality and low prices is, in general, 
not a sustainable business idea for a long time  
(Confidential importer).
4 The EU industry complaint against imports of ceramic tiles 
from China is not exclusively related to the price, even 
though the price is the easiest thing to challenge. Another 
important aspect to consider is intellectual property rights. 
The view on behalf of parts of the ceramic tile industry in 
the EU is that the Chinese producers are imitating their 
products, with regard to the design, and producing copied 
products at a lower cost. In any case, intellectual property 
rights have nothing to do with the anti-dumping instrument. 
There are specific WTO rules on intellectual property 
rights, and these rules should be adhered to when relevant.
5 In the anti-dumping investigation, the price of Chinese 
imports was, on the contrary, said to have decreased from 
4.7 euro/m2 in 2007 to 4.5 euro/m2 in the investigation 
period (EC, 2011b). This difference in average import price 
compared to the Eurostat statistics is due to the fact that 
the calculations in the anti-dumping investigations are 
based only on the sample and not on all trade that took 
place in reality.
6 Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Thailand and 
Turkey were suggested as possible analogue countries 
(EC, 2011b). However, it is an inherent problem in 
anti-dumping investigations that exporting countries 
competing with Chinese exports would not voluntarily make 
the effort that is required to participate in an anti-dumping 
investigation that would offer no benefit to their business 
activities. On the contrary, if Chinese exports to the EU 
were limited, the remaining third country exporters would 
most likely benefit from a higher demand on their products. 
In addition, certain interested parties claimed that 
producers in potential analogue countries experienced 
“undue pressure by Union producers associations” in  
order not to participate in the anti-dumping investigation 
(European Council, 2011).
7 In this context, it is relevant to consider the competitive-
ness of the EU industry. As apparent from the anti-dumping 
investigation, exports of ceramic tiles from the EU 
decreased by 44% during the investigation period (EC, 
2011b). The decrease in demand of EU ceramic tiles is 
noted both within and outside of the EU. 
8 It was claimed by interested parties in the course of  
the anti-dumping investigation that half of the imports of 
ceramic tiles from China were imported by the EU industry 
and rebranded to be resold on the EU market (Confidential 
importer). Accordingly, the EU industry imports of ceramic 
tiles from China could possibly account only for 3% of 
sales on the EU market (Confidential importer). If Chinese 
imports constitute a problem for the EU industry, this would 
be a clear case of self-inflicted injury. 
9 According to Article 4.1 of the EU Anti-dumping Regula-
tion, the anti-dumping analysis should be made to the EU 
industry as a whole and not to certain groups or types of 
companies (European Council, 2009). However, the 
anti-dumping investigation team argues that, according to 
Article 17 of the EU Anti-dumping Regulation, “investiga-
tions may be limited to … samples which are statistically 
valid … or to the largest representative volume of 
production, sales or exports which can reasonably be 
investigated” (European Council, 2009). As a result, there 
are doubts regarding the statistical validity of the sampling 
exercise.
10 Small companies [<5 million m2] account for 80% of the 
companies and 52% of the EU production; medium-sized 
companies [5–10 million m2] account for 10% of the 
number of companies and 24% of the EU production; and 
large companies [> 10 million m2] account for 5% of the 
number of companies and 24% of the EU production (EC, 
2011b; EC, 2011d). There are approximately 350 small 
companies, 40 medium-sized companies and 20 large 
companies in the EU (EC, 2011b). The anti-dumping 
investigation team selected only 10 out of 500 companies 
– of which 1 large, 4 medium and 5 small – from Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Germany and France, representing 7% of 
the total EU production (EC, 2011b). As a comparison, 
only 10 out of 400 exporting producers, accounting for 
14% of the total volume of exports from China to the EU, 
were considered in the sample (EC, 2011b). 
11 According to interested parties, the profit of the EU 
industry had gone up significantly during the last quarter  
of the investigation period, something that indicated that 
the EU industry had recovered from the economic crisis 
(European Council, 2011). If profits of ceramic tile 
producers in the EU increase further during the months 
following the investigation period, this is not considered  
in the anti-dumping investigation, which is limited to the 
predefined investigation period but important to recall, 
since the anti-dumping measures affect future imports.
12 In Part II, the performance of the EU Member States on the 
internal market will be analysed in line with the dumping 
criteria in order to estimate if this phenomenon is taking 
place within the EU, and if this intra-EU “dumping” is 
considered as a case of normal competition instead of a 
cause of injury to the domestic industry.
13 In the ceramic tiles case, the “reasonable” profit was based 
on the profit that should be achieved by an industry of this 
type under “normal conditions of competition”, and in 
particular the profitability of 3.9% that the EU industry 
achieved in 2007. In the investigation, it was concluded 
that the EU industry operated below this “target profit” 
(European Council, 2011). The injury margin was, 
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20 The next task for the EU should be to continue this 
progressive approach in the negotiation of bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements with third countries. In 
support of this approach, it should be mentioned that, in 
recent years, a number of countries and regions have 
decided to bilaterally, or on a regional basis, exclude the 
use of the anti-dumping instrument in their free trade 
agreements, for example: Australia New Zeeland Closer 
Economic Relations Free Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), 
Canada–Chile, China–Hong Kong, China–Macao, 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), EFTA–Chile, 
EFTA–Singapore (Budetta et al., 2007).
21 The concept of dominant position refers to either no 
competitor or no substantial competition. In addition to a 
market share of 40–50%, other criteria, such as financial 
strength, access to procurement and distribution channels, 
links with other companies, legal and de facto market 
entrance barriers, are considered on a case-by-case basis 
(Knorr, 2004).
22 In this context, it is also relevant to note that some experts 
argue that the undercutting of the average variable 
production cost should not be considered as an abuse of 
dominant position in competition law. There might be some 
reasons to sell for less than the average variable cost of 
production than trying to gain market shares from competi-
tors, e.g. loss-minimisation by selling an outdated product at 
below cost. In addition, it is impossible to exactly determine 
short-run average variable costs, i.e. it is a static concept 
that can only be determined ex-post if economies of scale 
persist; multi-product firms pose enormous difficulties in the 
proper allocation of joint costs; competitors do not have the 
same average variable costs, i.e. the calculation is based only 
on the dominant competitor which might be more efficient, 
something that protects other companies from normal 
competition; and the calculation is based only on profit in the 
short run, not on the maximisation of intertemporal profit 
(Nielsen, 1994; Knorr, 2004). In light of the difficulties in 
condemning price undercutting if a dominant company is 
selling below the average variable cost of production 
(non-dominant companies are, according to competition law, 
allowed to use price undercutting), it is important to note that 
in the case of anti-dumping investigations, a non-dominant 
company (or a number of companies in a single country) 
might be selling for above the average total cost of 
production, including a profit, and still be condemned.
23 In anti-dumping investigations, the constructed sales  
price is based on the following three elements: (i) cost of 
manufacturing; (ii) selling, administrative and general 
expenses; and (iii) profit. The profit levels are artificially 
assigned in an anti-dumping investigation. The “reason-
able” profit calculation is based on the profitable sales  
(and not on the unprofitable sales) on the domestic market. 
The profit level in the constructed normal value is mostly 
higher than the profit levels achieved by the EU industry, 
indicating that it would be defined as dumping and causing 
injury on the EU market if this method of defining dumped 
prices would be used against the EU industry.
24 The anti-dumping investigation team is convinced that  
the Chinese exporters of ceramic tiles to the EU have a 
common price strategy in order to be able to compete with 
the EU producers. In the anti-dumping investigation, it was 
argued that the fact that the “price differential … between 
Chinese imports and the prices of the Union industry was 
very significant … already in 2007 … suggest that the 
price strategy by the Chinese exporting producers started 
before the economic crisis” (EC, 2011b).
accordingly, estimated to be in the range of 52.6–95.8% 
(European Council, 2011).
14 The anti-dumping investigation team selected only 7 
unrelated importers, which accounted for 6% of the total 
imports from China in the anti-dumping investigation, but 
received only replies from 5 sampled importers (EC, 
2011b).
15 In certain cases, it is simply stated that the EU industry 
might disappear if anti-dumping measures are not be 
imposed. Whether this would be of harm to anyone but  
the EU industry itself is not discussed in the analysis.
16 The current anti-dumping investigation practice, which 
compares the benefits of the total EU industry with the cost 
to each individual user or consumer, makes the measures 
seem less important to the users/consumers and more 
important to the EU industry. The total value of trade of  
the anti-dumping measures would be 297 million euros if 
the anti-dumping investigation data on volume and price of 
the EU imports of ceramic tiles from China was used  
(EC, 2011b).  As a result, the accumulated extra cost  
to consumers would be 33 million euros if the levels of 
imports remained constant. This is the extra cost to the 
importers, user industry and consumers that demand the 
product to be imported. 
17 This use of a “buy European” aspect should not be a part 
of the Union interest test analysis in the anti-dumping 
investigation. 
18 The number of EU15 and/or EU25 anti-dumping measures 
against current EU27 members in decreasing order: 
Poland (20), Romania (12), Czech Republic (11), Lithuania 
(10), Bulgaria (8), Slovakia (8), Hungary (7), Estonia (3) 
and Latvia (2) (based on European Commission Directo-
rate-General for Trade webpage). The measures were in 
force until the accession of the countries to the EU.
19 Anti-dumping measures are not permitted between 
members of the EU. The anti-dumping regulation is 
reserved for dumping from outside the EU. In a strict WTO 
legal sense, it is not possible to discuss dumping within a 
customs union, such as the EU. Paragraph 8(b) of GATT 
Article XXIV requires WTO members who form a preferen-
tial trade area to eliminate duties and other regulations, 
substantially restricting all the trade in order to achieve a 
common market (Budetta et al., 2007). The Treaty of Rome 
prohibited the use of anti-dumping measures on intra-area 
trade once the transition period for full implementation of 
the treaty had expired. “If, during the transitional period,  
the Commission … finds that dumping is being practised 
within the common market, it shall address recommenda-
tions to the person or persons with whom such practices 
originate for the purpose of putting an end to them. Should 
the practices continue, the Commission shall authorise the 
injured Member State to take protective measures. …  
As soon as this Treaty enters into force, products which 
originate in or are in free circulation in one Member State 
and which have been exported to another Member State 
shall, on reimportation, be admitted into the territory of the 
first-mentioned State free of all customs duties, quantita-
tive restrictions or measures having equivalent effect.” No 
formal linkage was established between the application  
of common competition rules and the elimination of 
anti-dumping measures, and the antitrust criteria are very 
different from those applied in anti-dumping. However, the 
section on dumping (Article 91) is found in the chapter on 
competition in the Treaty of Rome (European Commission 
webpage).
25
25 The competition authorities could, in line with this 
argument, investigate the effects of the anti-dumping 
legislation, e.g. the cooperation between domestic 
producers (i.e. competitors), with an imminent risk of 
creating cartels, in order to present a complaint; the 
cooperation between importers and the user industry  
(also competitors), in order to present evidence against a 
complaint; and the protection of monopolistic or oligopolis-
tic situations on an EU and/or worldwide basis. There is 
also a risk that dissemination of information, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, in relation to the anti-dumping investigation 
might affect price decisions and the level of competition. 
Current anti-dumping rules allow exporters to restrict 
competition in their favour by making use of price 
undertakings, i.e. a way of colluding with their domestic 
competitors. Accordingly, anti-dumping rules can be 
considered to be a trigger for dumping with the aim of 
forming unlawful cross-border cartels (Knorr, 2004).
26 It has been claimed that the EU industry is in need of 
restructuring its production processes. The process of 
restructuring and consolidation that has been going on 
over the past two decades should be allowed to continue, 
as the EU ceramic tile industry is still highly fragmented 
(EC, 2011b).
27 The anti-dumping investigation team claims that the “Union 
industry had to focus on small batches of the product 
concerned where demand was more fragmented with 
lower quantities and a bigger variety” (EC, 2011b). It was 
also argued that “the Union industry was able to maintain 
its presence on the whole market by the means of 
compression of its sales prices and the production of a 
costlier product mix” (European Council, 2011). As a 
result, “Union producers have a highly diversified produc-
tion and … they are more and more dealing with small bulk 
orders” (EC, 2011d).
28 Prodcom codes that serve as a basis for the intra-EU 
dumping margin calculations: 23311010, 23311020, 
23311053, 23311057, 23311071, 23311073, 
23311075, and 23311079.
29 Prodcom codes and corresponding CN codes: 23311010 
(CN 69071000), 23311020 (CN 69081010, CN 
69081090), 23311053 (CN 69079091), 23311057  
(CN 69079010, CN 69079093, CN 69079099), 
23311071 (CN 69089011, CN 69089031), 23311073 
(CN 69089021, CN 69089091), 23311075 (CN 
69089093), and 23311079 (CN 69089021, CN 
69089029, CN 69089051, CN 69089099).
30 The international commercial term “CIF” provides the cargo 
insurance and delivery of goods to the destination at the 
seller’s expense. The buyer is responsible for the import 
customs clearance and other costs and risks.
31 Due to the aggregated level of the statistics, it is impos-
sible to verify exceptionally high “domestic price” values, in 
relation to the “export price”, for certain EU Member States 
(e.g. United Kingdom, 128.4 euro/m2, with regard to the 
Prodcom code 23311020 and Estonia, 80.0 euro/m2, with 
regard to the Prodcom code 23311075). Given the 
possibility for outliers in these rather extreme cases, these 
“dumping margins” are not presented in Table 1.
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